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Abstract. We introduce a generalization of the NTRU cryptosystem
and describe its advantages and disadvantages as compared with the orig-
inal NTRU protocol. This extension helps to avoid the potential problem
of finding “enough” invertible polynomials within very thin sets of poly-
nomials, as in the original version of NTRU. This generalization also
exhibits certain attractive “pseudorandomness” properties that can be
proved rigorously using bounds for exponential sums.
1 A Generalization of NTRU
In this generalization of the originalNTRU cryptosystem [5, 6], one selects integer
parameters (N, p, q) and four sets Lf ,Lg,Lϕ,Lm of polynomials in the ring
R = ZZ[X ]/(XN − 1) as in the standard version of NTRU. We denote by  the
operation of multiplication in the ring R. The parameters q and p are distinct
prime numbers such that gcd(N, q) = 1, and the sets Lf ,Lg,Lϕ,Lm are chosen
to satisfy the “width condition”
‖pϕ g + f m‖ < q
for all polynomials f ∈ Lf , g ∈ Lg, ϕ ∈ Lϕ, m ∈ Lm, where for any polynomial
F (X) = F0 + F1X + . . .+ FN−1X
N−1,
we define the width of F by
‖F‖ = max
0≤ν≤N−1
Fν − min
0≤ν≤N−1
Fν .
Our extension of the original NTRU scheme can be described as follows.
Key Creation. Alice randomly selects polynomials f ∈ Lf , g ∈ Lg and G ∈ R
such that G has an inverse modulo q and f has an inverse modulo p. This is easily
accomplished since G is allowed to range over all of R, and p will be very small
in any practical implementation of this scheme. Alice first computes inverses G∗q
and f∗p that satisfy
GG∗q ≡ 1 (mod q), f  f
∗
p ≡ 1 (mod p), (1)
then Alice computes the products
h ≡ G∗q  g (mod q), H ≡ G
∗
q  f (mod q). (2)
Alice publishes the pair of polynomials (h,H) as her public key, retaining
(f, g,G) as her private key. The polynomial f∗p is simply stored for later use, and
the polynomial G∗q may be discarded.
Encryption. Suppose Bob (the encrypter) wants to send a secret message to Alice
(the decrypter). Bob selects a message m from the set of plaintexts Lm. Next,
Bob selects a random polynomial ϕ ∈ Lϕ and uses Alice’s public key (h,H) to
compute
e ≡ pϕ h+H m (mod q).
Bob then transmits e to Alice.
Decryption. Alice has received e from Bob. To decrypt the message, she first
computes
a ≡ G e ≡ pϕ g + f m (mod q),
choosing the coefficients of a to lie in the interval from −q/2 to q/2. The remain-
der of our procedure now follows the standard version of NTRU; that is, Alice
treats a as a polynomial with integer coefficients and recovers the message by
computing
m ≡ f∗p  a (mod p).
One easily verifies that the case G = f corresponds to the classical NTRU
cryptosystem (in this case, H = 1, so the public key consists solely of the poly-
nomial h). Moreover, if f (and therefore H) is invertible modulo q, then this
generalization is equivalent to the original scheme. Indeed, instead of decrypting
e the attacker can try to decrypt
eH∗q ≡ pϕ
(
H∗q  h
)
+m (mod q),
where H∗qH ≡ 1 (mod q). On the other hand, if f is a zero-divisor in the ring
R, then our construction seems to produce a new scheme.
The main disadvantage of this scheme versus the classical NTRU scheme is
that the public key size and the encryption time are roughly doubled.
The advantages are:
◦ This scheme provides more flexibility in the choice of parameters. In partic-
ular, it is likely that this generalization is more robust against some of the
known attacks on classical NTRU. In particular, for a lattice attack (which
is by far the most “dangerous” threat to NTRU), in this setting one must
work with more general lattices than in the original scheme.
◦ One can prove some theoretical results about the set of inverses G∗q . In par-
ticular, although the issue has never been doubted in practice, it is not clear
how to prove rigorously that there exist “enough” invertible polynomials
f ∈ Lf in the NTRU scheme. In our scheme, G is selected from the entire
ring R, and the density of invertible polynomials has been explicitly eval-
uated in [11]. One can also prove some rigorous statements concerning the
distribution of h and H , and also about the distribution of e (thus showing
that the ciphertext e and the plaintext message m are uncorrelated).
◦ One can select G to have very small degree, which will speed-up the decryp-
tion procedure as compared with the original NTRU scheme.
◦ It is possible to select h once and for all as a universal quantity (thus reducing
the public key size), or it can be selected to have a certain special form
(to speed-up the encryption), although it is not clear whether or not these
choices might compromise the security of this scheme; this question should
be studied in more detail. With such a modification, G would be computed
in terms of f , g, and h, and the public key size be roughly the same as for
classical NTRU.
In what follows, we present rigorous proofs of some of the theoretical results
alluded to above. In particular, we show that for almost all G ∈ R∗, the set of
polynomials {pϕh}, where h is defined by (1) and (2) and ϕ runs over the set
Lϕ (which can be rather arbitrary), is uniformly distributed. This means that
for almost all G, the message m (or, equivalently, the product Hm) is reliably
concealed by adding {pϕ h}.
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2 Character Sums
Let Rq be the reduction of R modulo q, and let R
∗
q be the set of invertible
polynomials in Rq. We use  for multiplication in the ring Rq.
Recall that the cardinality ofR∗q is given by an analogue of the Euler function
|R∗q | = q
N
r∏
j=1
(1− q−nj ) (3)
where n1, . . . , nr are the degrees of the r ≥ 1 irreducible divisors of X
N − 1.
Though we will not need this, a more explicit expression for nj’s (hence also for
|R∗q |) is given in [11]; see also Section 6.5 of [3] and Section 7.5 of [10].
Let XN − 1 = Ψ1(X) . . . Ψr(X) be the complete factorization of X
N − 1
into irreducible polynomials in the ring Rq. Because gcd(N, q) = 1, we see that
XN − 1 is square-free in Rq, hence all of these factors are pairwise distinct.
We recall that IFq[X ]/Φ(X) ∼= IFqm for any irreducible polynomials Φ(X) ∈
IFq[X ] with degΦ = m. For each j = 1, . . . , r, we fix a root αj of Ψj(X), and
denote
IKj = IFqnj = IFq(αj) ∼= IFq[X ]/Ψj(X). (4)
where nj = degΨj . For each j, let
Trj(z) =
nj−1∑
k=0
zq
k
be the trace of z ∈ IKj to IFq.
We denote by A the direct product of fields
A = IK1 × . . .× IKr,
and we have a natural isomorphism
Rq ∼= IK1 × . . .× IKr = A (5)
given by the map that sends f ∈ Rq to af = (f(α1), . . . , f(αr)) ∈ A. In partic-
ular, the relation (3) from immediately from (5).
For every vector a = (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ A, let χa be the character of Rq given by
χa(f) =
r∏
j=1
e (Trj (ajf (αj))) , f ∈ Rq,
where
e(z) = exp(2piiz/q).
It is easy to shown that {χa |a ∈ A} is the complete set of additive characters
of Rq. In particular, for any polynomial f ∈ Rq, one has
∑
a∈A
χa(f) =
{
0, if f 6= 0,
qN , if f = 0.
(6)
Our main results rely on an upper bound for character sums of the form
Wa(L) =
∑
Q∈R∗q
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ϕ∈L
χa(Q ϕ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , a ∈ A.
To estimate these sums, we need the following identity (see Section 1 of
Chapter 5 of [9]) ∑
xj∈IKj
e(Trj(xj c)) =
{
0, if c 6= 0,
qnj , if c = 0,
(7)
which holds for any c ∈ IKj , j = 1, . . . , r.
Lemma 1. Let a = (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ A and let J ⊆ {1, . . . , r} be the set of j with
aj 6= 0. Then the bound
Wa(L) ≤ |R
∗
q |
1/2|L|1/2qN/2
∏
j 6∈J
qnj/2
holds.
Proof. Using the Cauchy inequality and extending the summation over all poly-
nomials Q ∈ Rq, we derive
Wa(L)
2 ≤ |R∗q |
∑
Q∈Rq
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ϕ∈L
χa (Q ϕ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= |R∗q |
∑
Q∈Rq
∑
ϕ1,ϕ2∈L
χa (Q (ϕ1 − ϕ2))
≤ |R∗q |
∑
ϕ1,ϕ2∈L
∑
Q∈Rq
r∏
j=1
e (Trj (ajQ(αj) (ϕ1(αj)− ϕ2(αj)))) .
From the isomorphism (5), we see that as Q runs over the set Rq the vector
(Q (α1) , . . . , Q (αr)) runs through the set IK1 × . . .× IKr. Therefore
Wa(L)
2 ≤ |R∗q |
∑
ϕ1,ϕ2∈L
r∏
j=1
∑
xj∈IKj
e (Trj (ajxj (ϕ1(αj)− ϕ2(αj))))
= |R∗q |
∏
j 6∈J
qnj
∑
ϕ1,ϕ2∈L
∏
j∈J
∑
xj∈IKj
e (Trj (ajxj (ϕ1(αj)− ϕ2(αj)))) .
From (7) we see that the product vanishes if ϕ1(αj) 6= ϕ2(αj) for some j ∈ J ,
and ∏
j∈J
∑
xj∈IKj
e (Trj (ajxj (ϕ1(αj)− ϕ2(αj)))) =
∏
j∈J
qnj
otherwise. Since {Ψj | j = 1, . . . , r} are irreducible polynomials, the condition
ϕ1(αj) = ϕ2(αj) is equivalent to Ψj
∣∣(ϕ1 − ϕ2). Hence
Wa(L)
2 ≤ |R∗q |q
NM(J ),
where M(J ) is the number of pairs ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ L with
ϕ1 ≡ ϕ2 (mod
∏
j∈J
Ψj).
For each ϕ1 ∈ L there are at most
qN
∏
j∈J
q−nj =
∏
j 6∈J
qnj
such values for ϕ2. Consequently
M(J ) ≤ |L|
∏
j 6∈J
qnj ,
and the lemma follows. uunionsq
3 Uniformity of Distribution
If we assume for simplicity that g ∈ Lg is invertible modulo q, it follows that
Q = pG∗q  g runs through the entire set R
∗
q together with G. Thus it suffices
to study the distribution of {Q  ϕ |ϕ ∈ L} “on average” for Q ∈ R∗q . We
remark that the condition g ∈ R∗q is equivalent to gcd(g,X
N − 1) = 1, and we
will always need a condition of this type in any case; otherwise, the number of
possible values for h becomes too small, and the cryptosystem is then vulnerable
to a brute force attack.
Given polynomials S ∈ Rq and Q ∈ R
∗
q , a set L ⊆ Rq, and an integer d, we
denote by Nd(S,Q,L) the number of polynomials ϕ ∈ L such that the inequality
deg(S −Q ϕ) < d holds.
Thus, roughly speaking, Nd(S,Q,L) counts how many products Q ϕ with
ϕ ∈ L are “close” to the given polynomial S. Our main result claims that this
number is very close to the expected value for almost all polynomials Q ∈ R∗q . In
particular, this means that for almost all polynomials Q ∈ R∗q , the encryptions e
(of the same message m) in our modification of NTRU, obtained with randomly
chosen polynomials ϕ ∈ Lϕ, are uniformly distributed in R.
Theorem 1. For q ≥ 5, the bound
1
|R∗q |
∑
Q∈R∗q
∣∣∣∣Nd(S,Q,L)− |L|qN−d
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3Nq−1/2 |L|1/2
holds.
Proof. Clearly, Nd(S,Q,L) = q
−d Td(S,Q,L), where Td(S,Q,L) is the number
of representations Qϕ = S+ψ1−ψ2 with ϕ ∈ L and polynomials ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Rq
of degree at most d− 1. From the identity (6) we derive
Td(S,Q,L) =
1
qN
∑
ϕ∈L
∑
ψ1,ψ2∈Rq
deg ψ1,deg ψ2≤d−1
∑
a∈A
χa(Q ϕ− S − ψ1 + ψ2)
=
1
qN
∑
a∈A
χa(−S)
∑
ϕ∈L
χa(Q ϕ)
∑
ψ1,ψ2∈Rq
degψ1,deg ψ2≤d−1
χa(ψ2 − ψ1)
=
1
qN
∑
a∈A
χa(−S)
∑
ϕ∈L
χa(Q ϕ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ψ∈Rq
deg ψ≤d−1
χa(ψ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
The term corresponding to a = 0 is equal to q2d−N |L|. For any nonempty set
J ⊆ {1, . . . , r}, let AJ be the subset of A consisting of all a = (a1, . . . , ar) such
that aj = 0 whenever j 6∈ J . Then we obtain
∣∣∣∣Td(S,Q,L)− |L|qN−2d
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1qN
∑
J⊆{1,...,r}
J 6=∅
∑
a∈AJ
a 6=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ϕ∈L
χa(Q ϕ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ψ∈Rq
degψ≤d−1
χa(ψ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
Applying Lemma 1, it follows that
∑
Q∈R∗q
∣∣∣∣Td(S,Q,L)− |L|qN−2d
∣∣∣∣
≤ |R∗q |
1/2|L|1/2q−N/2
∑
J⊆{1,...,r}
J 6=∅
∏
j 6∈J
qnj/2
∑
a∈AJ
a 6=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ψ∈Rq
deg ψ≤d−1
χa(ψ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
It is easy to see that
∑
a∈AJ
a 6=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ψ∈Rq
degψ≤d−1
χa(ψ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= −q2d +
∑
a∈AJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ψ∈Rq
deg ψ≤d−1
χa(ψ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= −q2d +
∑
ϕ,ψ∈Rq
deg ϕ,deg ψ≤d−1
∑
a∈AJ
χa(ϕ− ψ)
= −q2d +
∑
ϕ,ψ∈Rq
deg ϕ,deg ψ≤d−1
∑
a∈AJ
∏
j∈J
e (Trj (aj (ϕ (αj)− ψ (αj))))
= −q2d + U
∏
j∈J
qnj ,
where U is the number of pairs of ϕ, ψ ∈ Rq with degϕ, degψ ≤ d − 1 and
such that ϕ (αj) = ψ (αj) for all j ∈ J . Since this condition is equivalent to the
polynomial congruence
ϕ(X) ≡ ψ(X) (mod
∏
j∈J
Ψj(X)),
we derive that
U =


q2d
∏
j∈J
q−nj , if d ≥
∑
j∈J
nj ,
qd, otherwise.
Hence, in either case
0 ≤ −q2d + U
∏
j∈J
qnj ≤ qd
∏
j∈J
qnj ,
and consequently
∑
a∈AJ
a 6=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ϕ∈Rq
degϕ≤d−1
χa(ψ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ qd
∏
j∈J
qnj .
Therefore, we have
1
|R∗q |
∑
Q∈R∗q
∣∣∣∣Td(S,Q,L)− |L|qN−2d
∣∣∣∣
≤ |R∗q |
−1/2|L|1/2qd−N/2
∑
J⊆{1,...,r}
J 6=∅
∏
j 6∈J
qnj/2
∏
j∈J
qnj
= |R∗q |
−1/2|L|1/2qd
∑
J⊆{1,...,r}
J 6=∅
∏
j∈J
qnj/2
= |R∗q |
−1/2|L|1/2qd

 r∏
j=1
(
1 + qnj/2
)
− 1


< |R∗q |
−1/2|L|1/2qd
r∏
j=1
(
1 + qnj/2
)
= |L|1/2qd−N/2
r∏
j=1
(
1− q−nj
)−1/2 (
1 + qnj/2
)
= |L|1/2qd
r∏
j=1
(
1− q−nj
)−1/2 (
1 + q−nj/2
)
.
Since (1− x2)−1/2(1+ x) < 3x for every x in the open interval 0 < x < 1/2, and
each term q−nj/2 lies in this interval since q ≥ 5, we have
r∏
j=1
(
1− q−nj
)−1/2 (
1 + q−nj/2
)
<
r∏
j=1
3q
−nj/2
≤
r∏
j=1
3q
−1/2
≤ 3Nq
−1/2
.
Consequently
1
|R∗q |
∑
Q∈R∗q
∣∣∣∣Td(S,Q,L)− |L|qN−2d
∣∣∣∣ < qd 3Nq−1/2 |L|1/2,
and the theorem follows immediately. uunionsq
4 Remarks
We remark that for the special set Lϕ considered in [5], the bound on M(J ) in
Lemma 1 can be improved, which leads to a stronger bound in Theorem 1.
We have already mentioned that using polynomials G of small degree can
speed up the decryption procedure. It has been shown in [1] that using the
method of [7, 8] (see also [4]), one can obtain an analogue of Theorem 1 for
polynomials G of the form G = G1G2 where G1, G2 are irreducible polynomials
of very small degree; see also [2].
The above result is just one out of many other statements of similar nature
which can be proved for the generalization of NTRU introduced in this paper.
Finally, we remark that an analogue of Theorem 1 can be obtained in any
polynomial ring of the form IFq[X ]/F (X), where F (X) ∈ IFq[X ] is a square-free
polynomial.
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